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We draw a distinction between the social integration and economic assimilation of migrants, 
and study an interaction between the two. We define social integration as blending into the 
host country’s society, and economic assimilation as acquisition of human capital that is 
specific to the host country’s labor market. We show that a non-integrated migrant finds it 
optimal to acquire a relatively limited quantity of human capital; with fellow migrants 
constituting his only comparison group, a non-integrated migrant does not have a relative-
deprivation-based incentive to close the income gap with the natives. However, when a 
migrant is made to integrate, his social proximity to the natives exposes him to relative 
deprivation, which in turn prompts him to form more destination-specific human capital in 
order to increase his earnings and narrow the income gap with the natives. In this way, 
social integration becomes a catalyst for economic assimilation.  
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In the literature on international migration, the terms “assimilation” and “integration” 
are often used interchangeably; both refer to the incorporation of migrants into the host 
country’s social-economic fabric. Yet the two are not the same; each is associated with a 
different mode of adaptation.  
In this paper we differentiate between economic assimilation and social integration, 
taking them to refer to the acquisition of different types of capital in the destination country.1 
We define economic assimilation as the acquisition of destination-specific human capital: 
skills, the processes and protocols of production, the knowledge of how to do things, and 
other productive assets and attributes. The more economically assimilated a migrant, the 
higher his productivity and earnings in the host country. Naturally, the acquisition of human 
capital requires effort, and effort is costly. We define social integration as the acquisition of 
destination-specific social capital - blending into the host country’s society, mingling and 
interacting with the native population.2 
Metaphorically, we can think of economic assimilation as a move in the economic 
sphere, and of social integration as a move in the social space. The latter move brings about 
proximity to the natives and intensifies earnings comparisons with them. Because the earnings 
of the natives are typically higher than those of migrants, this comparison inflicts a painful 
sense of relative deprivation. In a way, social integration is a revision of identity; a migrant 
gradually ceases to perceive himself as a “migrant” and, instead, increasingly perceives 
himself as part of the majority society.3  
                                                 
1 For example, Dustmann and Fabbri (2003) differentiate between “economic assimilation” and “social 
integration,” although they do not provide a definition of “social integration.” Borjas et al. (1992) use the term 
“assimilation” in the context of acquiring “location-specific human capital.”  
2 The German Federal Ministry of the Interior put it like this: “Integration means living together as one society, 
not in separate worlds[, ...] feeling part of a community and developing a common understanding of how to live 
together in society.” 
http://www.bmi.bund.de/EN/Themen/MigrationIntegration/Integration/IntegrationPolicy/Integration_policy_nod
e.html 




Considerable evidence across countries and over time indicates that quite often both 
assimilation and integration are partial, and that sometimes integration does not occur at all.4 
In this paper we delineate a causal relationship between assimilation and integration. In a 
nutshell, our argument is as follows: in a given community of migrants, in the absence of 
exogenously imposed integration, migrants halt their acquisition of destination-specific 
human capital at the point at which the cost of assimilation starts to overshadow the utility 
gain from the consequent increase in their income. Migrants do not assimilate more or fully in 
the economic sphere because, for example, living in concentrated communities or enclaves, 
not integrating with the natives, insulates them from exposure to relative deprivation. In turn, 
such disassociation “shields” migrants from an additional incentive to boost their earnings by 
means of accumulating more destination-specific human capital. However, when such 
migrants are forced or encouraged to become more integrated, then the ensuing relative 
deprivation encourages them to assimilate more intensively.5,6 In a way, given our definitions 
of integration and assimilation, integration creates a positive assimilation externality. 
 
2. Modeling the assimilation behavior of migrants 
Consider a population of homogeneous migrants who arrive in the host country with no 
destination-specific human capital. (The possibility that migrants arrive in the destination 
country already with some human capital that is applicable in that country is studied in the 
                                                 
4 McManus et al. (1983), Tainer (1988), Shields and Price (2002), Chiswick and Miller (2002, 2005), and others 
present evidence on the lack of migrants’ proficiency in the host country’s language, and argue that this paucity 
has a negative effect on earnings. At the same time, it can be assumed that a lack of proficiency in the host 
country’s language implies limited contacts with the natives. Moreover, Chiswick and Miller (1995) and Lazear 
(1999, 2005) argue that low levels of assimilation occur when migrants live in concentrations (enclaves).  
5 Following the fourth (2010) “Integration Summit” organized by the German government, Chancellor Merkel 
stated bluntly: “the approach [...] that integration was not something that needed to be addressed, that people 
would live side-by-side and that it would sort itself out by itself [...] turned out to be false. What in fact is needed 
is a political effort and an effort by society as a whole to make integration happen.” 
http://www.thelocal.de/national/20101103-30921.html  
6 We make an implicit assumption here that a migrant who faces “compulsory integration” does not choose an 
outside option such as migrating to yet another country or returning home. 
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Appendix.) Working in the host country’s economy requires acquisition of such human 
capital which, in turn, necessitates exertion of costly effort. We denote by x the quantity of 
human capital that a migrant can acquire, and we assume that [0,1]x ∈  where 1x =  is the 
quantity of human capital of a native which, if acquired by a migrant, denotes his full 
assimilation, while 0x =  is the starting level of the destination-specific human capital of 
migrants. For the sake of convenience, we assume that the acquired human capital is 
converted into earnings on a one-to-one basis. This assumption enables us to refer to x both as 
the migrant’s quantity of human capital and as his earnings (income).  
A migrant chooses the quantity of human capital that maximizes his utility function, 
which is assumed to be 
 ( ) ( ) ( ) ( ),u x Y x RD x cC x= − −  (1) 
where the function ( )Y x  denotes the utility that the migrant derives from his income such that 






′ = ∞ ; ( )RD x  denotes the relative 
deprivation experienced by the migrant, which depends on the differences between the 
average income of each of his reference groups and his own income;7 and the parameter 0c >  






′ < ∞ , 
describe the cost of exerting effort to assimilate. We denote 
1




′≡ , and 
1




′≡ . Obviously, 1 0Y ≥ , and 1 0C > . 
By a “reference group” we mean the “comparison group,” namely, the individuals who 
co-occupy the migrant’s social space and to whose incomes the migrant compares his own. 
For a set of reference groups J, the relative deprivation sensed by the migrant is the sum of the 
levels of relative deprivation over the set, namely,  
 ( ) ( )
j
j J
RD x RD x
∈
=∑ , (2) 
                                                 
7 The hypothesis that an individual’s sense of wellbeing is affected adversely by unfavorable relative income 
comparisons (but is not measurably impacted by favorable ones) traces back to Veblen (1924). Measures of 
relative deprivation were proposed by Becker (1974), Yitzhaki (1979), and others. For evidence on the 
significance of relative deprivation in human affairs see, for example, Stark and Taylor (1989), Walker and 





RD x  is the relative deprivation with respect to the mean income of group j J∈ , 
j
X , that is, 
 ( ) ( )
j j
RD x F X x= − , 
such that for 0z >  we have that ( ) 0F z > , ( ) 0F z′ > , ) 0(F z′′ ≥ , 
0





′< < ∞ ;8 and for 
0z ≤  we have ( ) 0F z = . We denote 
0







2.1. A non-integrated community of migrants 
We first present the polar case in which migrants are not integrated with the native 
population, say they live in an enclave or in a concentrated community such that fellow 
migrants constitute the migrants’ exclusive reference group. Denoting the group of migrants 
by M, we have that in this case { }J M=  and therefore  
 ( ) ( ) ( )
M M
RD x RD x F X x= = − . 
From our assumption that the population of migrants is homogenous it follows that they 
all acquire the same quantity of destination-specific human capital and, therefore, we have 
that 
M
X x= , and thus ( ) 0
M
RD x = . Consequently, the utility function (1) reduces to 
 ( ) ( ) ( )
NI
u x Y x cC x= − , 
where subscript “NI” stands for “non-integrated.”  
We denote by *
NI
x  the quantity of human capital that maximizes the function ( )
NI
u x  for 
[0,1]x ∈ . For the sake of notational clarity, we extend the range of parameter c to include 0, 
and we define { }*sup 0 : 1NI NIc xc ≥= = . Thus, NIc  is the maximum level of the cost parameter 
at which a non-integrated migrant assimilates fully.  
Because ( )
NI
u x  is strictly concave with respect to x,9 for c such that  
                                                 
8 The requirement that the right hand side derivative of function F is greater than zero draws on a similar 
property of a widely-used measure of individual deprivation - the fraction of individuals in the population whose 
incomes are higher than the income of the reference individual, times their mean excess income (see, for 
example, Stark 2010). 
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 [ ] 1 1
1
lim ( ) 0( )
x
Y x cC x Y cC
−→
′ ′ = − ≥−  
the maximum is obtained at the right border of the range [0,1]x ∈ . Noting that 1 1Y cC−  is a 
linear expression that decreases with respect to c, with 1 0Y ≥ , and with 1 0C > , we get that 
NI
c  is the solution of 
 1 1 0Y cC− =  (3) 
and, if 0
NI
c > ,10 we will have that for (0, ]
NI
c c∈ , the optimal level of human capital of a 
non-integrated migrant is * 1
NI
x = . For 
NI
c c> , the optimal level of human capital, given by 
the first order condition ( ) 0
NI
u x′ = , solves 
 * *( ) ( ) 0
NI NI
Y x cC x′ ′− = , (4) 
which, recalling the definition of 
NI
c , implies that * 1
NI
x < .11 
Thus, migrants will find it optimal to choose the maximal level of human capital that is 
equal to the level of human capital of natives only if 
NI
c c≤ . And if the cost of exerting 
assimilation effort is higher than 
NI
c , the community of non-integrated migrants will remain 
not fully assimilated, and migrants’ earnings will be lower than those of members of the 
native population who, by definition, are fully “assimilated.” 
We next show that the stress from experiencing relative deprivation, which is brought 
about by the integration of migrants with the native population, acts as an incentive to acquire 
more destination-specific human capital, namely, to assimilate more, and thereby narrow the 
income gap with the natives. 
2.2. An integrated community of migrants 
                                                                                                                                                        
9 ( ) ( ) ( ) 0
NI
u x Y x cC x′′ ′′ ′′= − < . 
10 The specification of functions Y and C does not rule out the possibility that [ ]
1
lim ( ) ( ) 0
x
Y x cC x
→
′ ′− <  for any 
0c > , in which case 0
NI
c = . 
11 From the concavity of the function 
NI
u , the assumptions that we have made regarding the functions Y and C, 
and the definition of 
NI
c , it follows that 
*
NI
x  exists, is unique, and is strictly positive. 
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Suppose that migrants are made to treat natives as a reference group. This can be 
brought about, for example, by a housing policy combating the spatial segregation of 
migrants, compulsory language acquisition programs, or mandatory learning of the history 
and culture of the host country, stimulating interactions between migrants and the native 
population,12 and contributing to strengthening the identification of migrants with the native 
population. Then, migrants will have two reference groups: themselves, M; and the natives, N, 
namely, , }{J M N= . As already noted, the quantity of human capital and the income of each 
native worker are normalized at one, and thus 1
N
X = . Consequently, ( ) (1 )
N
RD x F x= − . 
And because the migrant population is homogeneous, we have, as before, that 
( ) (0) 0
M
RD x F= = , and thus ( ) ( (( 1 )) )
M N
RD x RD x R x F xD =+ −= . Therefore, the utility 
function of an integrated migrant takes the form 
 ( ) ( ) (1 ) ( )
I
u x Y x F x cC x= − − − .  
In a manner analogous to that of Subsection 2.1, we denote by *
I
x  the level of human 
capital that maximizes ( )
I
u x  for [0,1]x ∈ , and we denote by 
I
c  the maximal level of the cost 
parameter for which an integrated migrant assimilates fully, that is, { }*sup 0 : 1I Ic xc ≥= = . 
Because ( )
I
u x  is strictly concave with respect to x,13 then for c such that  
 [ ]
1
1 0 1lim ( ) (1 ) ) 0(
x
Y x F x cC x FY cC
−→
′ ′ ′− − = + − ≥+  
the maximum is obtained at the right border of the range [0,1]x ∈ . Noting that 1 0 1Y F cC+ −  is 
a linear expression that decreases with respect to c, with 1 0Y ≥ , 1 0C > , and 0 0F > , we get 
that 
I
c  is the solution of 
 1 0 1 0FY cC+ − =  (5) 
and we have that for , ](0
I
c c∈  it holds that * 1
I
x = ,14 whereas for 
I
c c>  the optimal quantity 
                                                 
12 For example, the Irish government supports “welcome” meetings, intercultural events such as social evenings, 
and sports days for newly-arrived migrants (Spencer and di Mattia, 2004). 
13 ( ) ( ) (1 ) ( ) 0
I
u x Y x F x cC x′′ ′′ ′′ ′′= − − − < . 
14 Because 
1 0
0Y F+ >  and 
1
C < ∞ , we get that 0
I
c > . 
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of human capital, given by the first order condition ( ) 0
I
u x′ = , solves15 
 * * *( ) (1 ) ( ) 0
I I I
Y x F x cC x′ ′ ′+ − − = . (6) 




x x≥  for any 0c > ; 
(b) 
I NI
c c> ; 
(c) * *
I NI
x x>  for 
NI
c c> . 
Claim 1 states that a socially integrated migrant will always assimilate in the economic 
sphere at least as much as a non-integrated migrant. Moreover, an integrated migrant will find 
it optimal to assimilate fully at a cost that is higher than that accepted by a non-integrated 
migrant (
I NI
c c> ). In addition, at a cost of assimilation such that a non-integrated migrant 
does not find it optimal to assimilate fully (
NI
c c> ), an integrated migrant will assimilate 
more than a non-integrated migrant will. 
Proof: For any (0,1)x ∈ , we have that (1 ) 0F x′ − >  and thus 
 ( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) (1 ) ( ) ( )
NI I
u x Y x cC x Y x F x cC x u x′ ′ ′ ′ ′ ′ ′= − < + − − = . (7) 
Consequently, because ( )
NI
u x  and ( )
I
u x  are strictly concave, we get, for *
NI
x  and *
I
x  as 
defined above, that * *
NI I
x x≤  for any 0c > , which completes the proof of part (a). 
Because 0 0F > , it follows that 1 0 1 1 1Y F cC CY c+ − > − , therefore (recalling (3) and (5)) 
I NI
c c> , which completes the proof of part (b).  
For , ](
NI I
c c c∈  we have that * 1
I
x = , whereas * 1
NI
x < . For 
I
c c> , using (7) we get that 
*
NI
x , which is (implicitly) defined by (4), is smaller than *
I
x , which is (implicitly) defined by 
(6). This completes the proof of part (c). □ 
                                                 
15 From the concavity of the function 
I
u , the assumptions that we have made regarding the functions Y and C, 
and the definition of 
I
c , it follows that 
*
I
x  exists, is unique, and is strictly positive. 
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Claim 1 informs us that, other than in a situation in which assimilation comes about 
relatively effortlessly to the migrant, integration promotes assimilation. In particular, policy-
imposed unpleasing income comparisons with natives that migrants experience when they are 
made to integrate with the host country’s society, motivate them to exert more assimilation 
effort than when they are detached from the natives. In a way, the mandated walk in social 
space intensifies movement in the economic sphere. 
 
2.3. An illustration 
Let the utility function in (1) take the following specific form: 
 (( ,) )x RDu x cxx −= −  (8) 
namely, we let ( )Y x x=  and ( )C x x= ; and recalling (2), we set ( ) max{ ,0}
j j
RD x X x= − . 
It is easy to verify that in this case, 1/ 2
NI
c =  and 3 / 2
I
c = , and that the solutions to (4) and 




















for 3 / 2c > .  
Then, if the cost of assimilation is such that a non-integrated migrant does not find it 
optimal to assimilate fully ( 1/ 2c > ), an integrated migrant will assimilate more extensively, 
and will assimilate fully if 3 / 2c ≤ . Figure 1 depicts the relationship between *
NI
x  and c, and 
between *
I







x  (the optimal level of destination-specific human capital acquired by a non-integrated migrant), and 
*
I
x  (the optimal level of destination-specific human capital acquired by an integrated migrant) as functions of the 
cost parameter c, for the utility function given in (8). 
 
3. Conclusion 
When the government of a host country supports and subsidizes migrants’ language 
acquisition and the learning of the history, culture, and values of the host society, it stimulates 
the social integration of migrants and seeks to relocate them in the social space of the host 
country’s society. As we have argued in this paper, this intensified social integration exposes 
migrants to a revised structure of incentives: they are thereby encouraged to acquire human 
capital assets that increase their productivity and boost their earnings. In sum, migration 
policies that bring migrants closer to natives in social space can make them better equipped in 
the market place. 
Our finding contributes also to the rich literature examining the impact of host-country 
language acquisition on migrants’ earnings. Seen from the perspective proposed in this paper, 
language acquisition is not only a direct channel to increased earnings (a productivity-
enhancing tool), as the received literature maintains; it also opens an indirect channel to 
10 
 
increased earnings (a motivation to acquire additional tools). The literature that measures the 
gain in earnings conferred on migrants by language acquisition thus underestimates the 
overall effect: setting in motion a process by which (additional) human capital assets are 
acquired encourages assimilation and productivity. 
Although hitherto we have referred to international migration, our argument is not 
confined to that form of migration. Consider the management of rural-to-urban migration in 
China. In urban China, migrants from the rural areas have limited access to the social services 
to which urban hukou holders are entitled.16 For example, in 2010, 20 percent of the migrants 
had access to health insurance, as opposed to 87 percent of workers with urban hukou (Meng 
2012); migrant children are often denied access to public schools; and so on. As a result of 
institutional discrimination, “[t]he labor markets for urban hukou workers and migrant 
workers are segregated” (Meng 2012, p. 92, emphasis added). This regime and the policy 
stance forging it are tantamount to institutional non-integration (social non-integration) which, 
as we have argued, curbs an incentive to assimilate in the economic sphere and increase 
productivity. There is concomitant evidence of an earnings gap: hourly wages of urban hukou 
workers are double those of migrants (Meng 2012). This segregation, reinforced by the hukou 
policy, could be why migrants do not feel the heat of this gap. Had they been exposed, it 
would have instilled in them an assimilation-type drive to narrow the earnings gap. 
                                                 
16 Hukou is the residential status of a Chinese citizen. It records whether an individual was born in the 
countryside (“agricultural” or “rural hukou”) or in a city (“nonagricultural” or “urban hukou”). The opportunities 
to change hukou status after migrating from the countryside to a city are severely limited (cf. Meng 2012, p. 75). 
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Appendix: Transferable human capital  
In the main text we assumed that a migrant enters the host country with no destination-
specific human capital ( 0x = ), and that in order to obtain a positive level of income, he has to 
exert some assimilation effort. In this Appendix, we consider a more general case in which 
part of the human capital acquired in the migrant’s home country is applicable as destination-
specific human capital, that is, a migrant enters the host country with some positive level of 
destination-specific human capital which we denote by 0 (0,1)x ∈ . We show that as long as 
the cost of acquiring human capital, characterized by parameter c, is such that an integrated 
migrant will find it optimal to have more human capital at destination than 0x , the qualitative 
findings presented in Claim 1 continue to hold.  
Specifically, a migrant who “starts” with some positive level of human capital in the 
destination country, 00 1x< < , chooses to acquire an additional quantity of human capital in 
the range 0[0,1 ]x x∈ − , such that his income becomes 0x x+ . The utility function of such a 
migrant is  
 0 0( ) ( ) ( ) ( ),u x Y x x RD x x cC x= + − + −  (A1) 
where the functions Y, C, and RD, and the parameter c are defined as in Section 2. 
Analogously to Subsection 2.1, we can write the utility function of a non-integrated 
migrant as 
 0( ) ( ) ( )NIu x Y x x cC x= + − . 
We denote by *
NI
x  the quantity of human capital that maximizes the function ( )
NI
u x  for 
0[0,1 ]x x∈ − , and we define { }0 *sup 0 : 0NI NIcc x≥= > , that is, the maximal level of the cost 
parameter for which the non-integrated migrant finds it optimal to exert a positive level of 





lim ( ) ( ) ( ) lim ( ) 0
x x
Y x x cC x Y x c C x
→ →
′ ′ ′ ′+ − = − > , 
therefore, either 0
NI
c = ∞  (in the case 
0




′ = ) or 0
NI
c  is the solution of 
 0
0
( ) lim ( ) 0
x
Y x c C x
→
′ ′− = . (A2) 
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Next, analogously to Subsection 2.1, we define { }1 0*sup 0 : 1NI NIx xc c= =≥ − , that is, 
1
NI




x x+ = ). Obviously, this happens for c such that  
 [ ] [ ]
0
0 0 1 0
(1 ) 1
lim ( ) ( ) lim ( ) (1 ) (1 ) 0
x x x
Y x x cC x Y x cC x Y cC x
− −
→ − →
′ ′ ′ ′ ′+ − = − = − − ≥− , 
where, as before, 
1




′≡ . Noting that 1 0(1 )Y cC x′− −  is a linear expression that 
decreases with respect to c, with 1 0Y ≥ , and with 0(1 ) 0C x′ − > , we get that 
1
NI
c  is the 
solution of 
 1 0(1 ) 0Y cC x′− − = , (A3) 
and, due to the concavity of Y and the convexity of C, we have that 01
NI NI
c c< .  
Thus, for 0
NI
c c≥ , we have that a non-integrated migrant does not find it optimal to 
acquire more human capital than his “starting” level 0x  and, therefore, 
* 0
NI
x = . For 
1 0,( )
NI NI
c cc∈ , the optimal level of human capital, given by the first order condition ( ) 0
NI
u x′ = , 
solves 
 * *0( ) ( ) 0NI NIY x x cC x′ ′+ − = , (A4) 
which, due to the definitions of 1
NI
c  and 0
NI
c , implies that * 00 1NIx x< < − , while for 
1(0, ]
NI
c c∈  
we have that * 01NIx x= − . 
Analogously to Subsection 2.2, the utility function of an integrated migrant is  
 0 0( ) ( ) (1 ) ( )Iu x Y x x F x x cC x= + − − − − . 
We denote by *
I
x  the quantity of human capital that maximizes the function ( )
I
u x  for 
0[0,1 ]x x∈ − , and we define { }0 *sup 0 : 0I Icc x≥= > . Analogously to the case of a non-
integrated migrant, either 0
I
c = ∞  (in case 
0




′ = ) or 0
I
c  is the solution of 
 0
0
0( ) (1 ) lim ( ) 0
x
Y x F x c C x
→
′ ′ ′+ − − = . (A5) 
We define { }* 01 sup 0 : 1I Ic c x x= = −≥  and, similarly as for a non-integrated migrant, we 
get that 1
I
c  is the solution of 
13 
 
 1 0 0(1 ) 0Y F C xc ′+ − − = , (A6) 
and, due to the concavity of the function Y, and the convexity of the functions C and F, we 
have that 01
I I
c c< .  
Thus, for 0
I
c c≥ , we have that an integrated migrant does not find it optimal to acquire 
more human capital than his “starting” level 0x  (
* 0
I
x = ). For 1 0,( )
I I
cc c∈ , the optimal level of 
human capital, given by the first order condition ( ) 0
I
u x′ = , solves 
 * * *0 0( ) (1 ) ( ) 0I I IY x x F x x cC x′ ′ ′+ + − − − = , (A7) 
which, due to the definitions of 1
I
c  and 0
I
c , implies that * 00 1Ix x< < − , whereas for 
1(0, ]
I
c c∈ , 
we have that * 01Ix x= − . 
We now state and prove the following Claim which for a non-zero starting human 




x x≥  for any 0c > ; 
(b) 1 1
I NI
c c> ; 
(c) * *
I NI
x x>  for 1 0,( )
NI I
c c c∈ . 
Proof: The proofs of parts (a) and (b) follow the same steps as those of the corresponding 
parts of Claim 1.  
To prove part (c), we first note from (A2) and (A5) that 0 0
I NI
c c≥ , where equality can 
hold only in the case 0 0
I NI
c c= = ∞ . Depending on the relationship between 0
NI
c  and 1
I
c , there 
are two possibilities to consider. 
First, if 0 1
NI I
c c≤ , then for 1 0,( )
NI NI
c cc ∈  we have that * 01Ix x= −  whereas 
*
00 1NIx x< < − ; 
and for 0 0[ , )
NI I
c c c∈  we have that * 0
NI
x =  while * 0
I
x > . This case, under the assumption that 
0
I
c < ∞ , is depicted in Figure A1. 
14 
 
Second, we discuss the complementary case 0 1
NI I
c c> , which is depicted in Figure A2. 
For 1 1,( ]
NI I
c c c∈ , we have that * 01Ix x= − , whereas 
*
00 1NIx x< < − . For 
1 0, )(
I NI
c cc ∈ , noting 
that for any 0(0,1 )x x∈ −  
 0 0 0( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) (1 ) ( ) ( )NI Iu x Y x x cC x Y x x F x x cC x u x′ ′ ′ ′ ′ ′ ′= + − < + + − − − = , 
we get that *
NI
x , which is (implicitly) defined by (A4), is smaller than *
I
x , which in turn is 
(implicitly) defined by (A7). Lastly, for 0 0,[ )
NI I
c c c∈  we have that * 0
NI
x =  while * 0
I
x > . This 
completes the proof of part (c). □ 
If 0
I
c = ∞ , then Claim A1 is equivalent to Claim 1: transferability of pre-migration 
possessed human capital does not qualitatively change our findings. If 0
I
c < ∞ , then compared 
to the findings in the main text, the range of the cost parameter c for which * *
I NI
x x>  is 
bounded from above for the case of transferable human capital. However, using (A5), the 
concavity of the function Y, and the convexity of the function F, we get that, treated as a 
function of 0x , 
0
I
c  is decreasing, namely the lesser the extent of the transferability of human 
capital, the more likely the human capital gain from policies aimed at promoting the 







x x+  (the optimal level of destination-specific human capital of a non-integrated migrant), and 
*
0I
x x+  (the optimal level of destination-specific human capital of an integrated migrant) as functions of the cost 
parameter c, for the utility function given in (A1), and for the case in which 
0 1
NI I
c c≤  and 
0
I







x x+  (the optimal level of destination-specific human capital of a non-integrated migrant), and 
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